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the unsolved case of landsbanki in dirty-deals luxembourg / 10 years on with 31 comments the icelandic sic report and court cases in iceland have made it abundantly clear that most of the questionable, and in some cases criminal, deals in the icelandic banks were executed in their luxembourg subsidiaries. all this is well known to authorities in luxembourg who have kindly assisted icelandic counterparts in obtaining evidence. one story, the landsbanki luxembourg equity release loans, still raises many questions, which luxemburg authorities do their best to ignore in spite of a promised investigation in 2013. some of these questions relate to the activities of the bank’s liquidator, ranging from consumer protection, the bank’s investment in the bank’s own bonds on behalf of clients and if the bank set up offshore companies for clients without their consent. the landsbanki luxembourg equity release loans were issued to clients in france and spain. indeed, all these loans were issued to clients outside of luxembourg. one intriguing fact emerged during the french trial in paris last year against landsbanki luxembourg and nine of its executives and advisors: the french clients got the bank’s loan documents in english, the non-french clients got theirs in french.* landsbanki iceland went into administration october 7 2008. the next day , landsbanki luxembourg was placed into moratorium; liquidation proceedings started 12 december. over the years, icelog has raised various issues regarding the landsbanki luxembourg equity release loans, mostly sold to elderly people (see here ). these issues firstly relate to how the bank handled these loans, both the marketing and the investments involved and secondly, how the liquidator yvette hamilius, has handled the landsbanki luxembourg estate and the many complaints raised by the equity release clients. a liquidator is an independent agent with great authority to investigate. there is abundant material in iceland, both from the 2010 report of the special investigative commission, sic and icelandic court cases where almost thirty bankers and others close to the banks have been sentenced to prison. these cases have invariably shown that the most dubious deals were done in the banks’ luxembourg operations. already by june 2015, liquidators of the estates of the three large icelandic banks were ending their work, handing remaining assets over to creditors. in the, in comparison, tiny estate of landsbanki luxembourg there is no end in sight due to various legal proceedings. yet, its arguably largest problem, the so-called avens bond , was solved already in 2011. at the time, már guðmundsson governor of the icelandic central bank paid tribute to the help received from amongst others hamiliusfor “considerable efforts in leading this issue to a successful conclusion.” the landsbanki luxembourg equity release clients have another story to tell, both in terms of their contacts with the liquidator and luxembourg authorities. in may 2012, these clients, who to begin with had each and everyone been struggling individually, had formed an action group and aired their complaints in a press release, questioning luxembourg’s moral standing and hamilius’ procedures. the following day, the group got an unexpected answer: luxembourg state prosecutor robert biever issued a press release . as i mentioned at the time, it was jaw-droppingly remarkable that a state prosecutor saw it as his remit to address a press release directed at the liquidator of a private company in a case the prosecutor had not investigated. according to biever, hamilius had offered the borrowers “an extremely favourable settlement” but “a small number of borrowers,” unwilling to pay, was behind the action. in 2013 luxembourg justice minister promised an investigation into the landsbanki products that was already taking “great strides.” so far, no news. the landsbanki luxembourg equity release scheme: high risk, rambling investments in theory, the magic of equity release loans is that by investing around 75% of the loan the dividend will pay off the loan in due course. i have seen calculations of some of the landsbanki equity release loans that make it doubtful that even with decent investments, the needed level of dividend could have been reached – the cost was simply too high. if something seems too good to be true it generally is. however, this offer came not from a dingy backstreet firm but from a bank regulated and supervised in luxembourg, a country proud to be the financial centre of europe. and landsbanki was not the only bank offering these loans, which interestingly have long ago been banned or greatly limited in other countries. in the uk, equity release loans wrecked havoc and created misery some decades ago, leading to a ban on putting up the borrower’s home as collateral. having scrutinised the investments made for some of the landsbanki luxembourg clients the first striking thing is an absolutely staggering foreign currency risk, also related to the icelandic króna. underlying bonds on the foreign entities such as rabobank and european investment bank were nominated in icelandic króna (see here on rabobank isk bond issue jan. 2008), in addition to the bonds of kaupthing and landsbanki, the largest and second largest icelandic banks at the time. currencies were bought and sold, again a strategy that will have generated fees for the bank but was of dubious use to the clients. the second thing to notice is the rudderless investment strategy. to begin with the money was in term deposits, i.e. held for a fixed amount of time, which would generate slightly higher interest rates than non-term deposits. then shares and bonds were bought but there was no apparent strategy except buying and selling, again generating fees for the bank. the equity release clients were normally not keen on risk but the investments were partially high risk. the 2007 and 2008 losses on some accounts i have looked have ranged from 10% to 12%. these were certainly testing years in terms of investment but amid apparently confused investing there was indeed one clear pattern. one clear investment pattern: investing in landsbanki and kaupthing bonds having analysed statements of four clients there is a recurring pattern, also confirmed by other clients and a source with close knowledge of the bank’s investments: in 2008 (and earlier) landsbanki luxembourg invariably bought landsbanki bonds as an investment for clients, thus turning the bank’s lending into its own finance vehicle. in addition, it also bought kaupthing bonds. the 2010 sic report cites examples of how the banks cooperated to mitigate risk for each other. it is not just in hindsight that buying landsbanki and kaupthing bonds as equity release investment was a doomed strategy. both banks had sky-high risk as shown by their credit default swap, cds. the cds are sort of thermometer for banks indicating their health, i.e. how the market estimates their default risk. the cds spread for both banks had for years been well below 100 points but started to rise ominously in 2007 as the risk of their default was perceived to rise. at the beginning of 2008, the cds spread for landsbanki was around 150 points and 300 points for kaupthing. by summer, kaupthing’s cds spread was at staggering 1000 points, then falling to 800 points. landsbanki topped close to 700 points. the unsustainably high cds spread for these two banks indicated that the market had little faith in their survival. with these spreads, the banks had little chance of seeking funds from institutional investors ( sic report , p.19-20). the red lights were blinking and yet, landsbanki luxembourg staff kept on steadily buying landsbanki and kaupthing bonds on behalf of clients who were clearly risk-averse investors. equity release investment in some details to give an idea of the investments landsbanki luxembourg made for equity release borrowers, here is some examples of inves

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http://uti.is/2015/10/
http://uti.is/2014/10/
http://uti.is/2011/05/
http://uti.is/2014/06/
http://uti.is/2013/10/
http://uti.is/2011/11/
http://uti.is/2016/02/
http://uti.is/2013/02/
http://uti.is/2015/06/
http://uti.is/2012/07/
http://uti.is/2010/09/
http://uti.is/2012/11/
http://uti.is/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/screenshot-2018-07-04-17.41.41.png
http://uti.is/2018/05/iceland-from-a-fishing-economy-to-tourism-10-years-on/#comments
http://uti.is/2012/05/
telegraph.co.uk
beta.companieshouse.gov.uk
independent.co.uk
legalbusiness.co.uk
landsbankivictims.co.uk
dailymail.co.uk
fca.org.uk

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dnssec: unsigned delegation
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nic-hdl: SD1066-IS
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source: ISNIC

nic-hdl: SD1-IS
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source: ISNIC

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source: ISNIC



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ADDRESS
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